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The purpose of this paper is to critically review the current discourses on “global governance” and 
to suggest an East Asian view of alternative governance mechanism from the perspective of “soft 
power.” This paper argues that many countries in the East Asian region have been either reluctantly or 
unknowingly following the global governance building, led by the “Western” countries, and therefore 
have failed to build a safety net for themselves in the form of a “region” or regional cooperation. 
Global governance is connected to the realm of soft power as it affects the preferences and behaviors 
of the actors while regarding the actual use of physical coercive forces as a last resort. Therefore, it is 
necessary to expand the discourse of global governance to include the discussion of soft power, and the 
East Asian region may need to develop its safety net by creating its own soft power and regional 
governance mechanism. Here, speech acts and standard setting are the prerequisites in developing 
East Asian soft power. Therefore this paper argues that East Asian actors use the concepts like the 
“East Asian Governance,” “East Asian Standard,” “East Asian Consensus” more frequently and 
intensely than before even if those terms still do not have concrete substances and contents to be inter-
subjectively taken by the actors in the region. As people use and speak of the terms more often and 
intensely, there will be more concrete efforts by the East Asian actors to substantiate the concepts, and 
the contents of East Asian governance will gradually evolve. 
 
Keywords: Global Governance, Soft Power, East Asian Governance, East Asian Standard, East 
Asian Consensus, National Safety Net. 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to critically review the current discourses on “global 
governance” and to suggest an East Asian view of alternative governance mechanism from 
the perspective of “soft power.” This paper will argue that the current global governance 
structure is “global politics by other means” connoting “network oriented global value 
allocation processes” that favor certain countries and actors at the expense of others. I will 
suggest that many countries in the East Asian region have been either reluctantly or 
unknowingly following the global governance building led by the “Western” countries, and 
therefore have failed to build a safety net for themselves in the form of a “region” or regional 
cooperation.  
Global governance pertains to the realm of soft power as it affects the preferences and 
behaviors of the actors while regarding the actual use of physical coercive forces as a last 
resort. Therefore, it is necessary to expand the discourse of global governance to the 
discussion of soft power, and the East Asian region may need to develop its safety net by 
creating its own soft power and regional governance mechanism. Here, speech acts and 
standard setting are the prerequisites in developing East Asian soft power, and therefore I 
will argue that East Asian actors use the concepts like the “East Asian Governance,” “East 
Asian Standard,” “East Asian Consensus” more frequently and intensely than before even if 
those terms still do not have concrete substances and contents to be inter-subjectively taken 
by the actors in the region. As people use and speak of the terms more often and intensely, 
more concrete efforts by the East Asian actors to substantiate the concepts will follow, and 
the contents of East Asian governance will gradually evolve accordingly. 
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1. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: WHAT DOES IT MEAN? 
 
With the end of the cold war and the expansion of globalization, the usage of the concept, 
“global governance” began to increase in the 1990s (Hewson and Sinclair 1999; Rosenau and 
Czempeli 1992; Rosenau 1990; Prakash and Jeffrey 1999; Young 1997).  However, to the 
students of international relations, the concept is not revolutionary or even intuitive, because 
international relations have always been characterized by “governance without world 
government” or the absence of “world government,” namely, anarchy. The concept of 
governance was initially introduced to comprehensively replace the concept of government 
in domestic politics as societies and politics increasingly became too complex for the 
government alone to govern. In the world of anarchy, or international relations, therefore, 
importing the concept of governance to the discipline of international relations was not a 
great eye opener. 
Yet, the increasing number and frequency of people and journals using the concept 
indicates that the concept, “global governance” is gaining a significant influence in terms of 
sociology of knowledge and also in terms of speech act. Particularly, the increasing 
frequency and acceptance of the concept in the Asian region, which is geographically distant 
from the place of the origin of the concept tells us that the concept is globalizing extremely 
rapidly, and widely expanding its sphere of influence. Accordingly, it is worthwhile to 
critically review the conceptual connotations of global governance. 
 
1.1. The Meaning of Governance: Maintaining the Stable Process of Value Allocation 
 
(1) Governance within the State 
The phenomenon of politics generally pertains to the process of allocation of values 
among diverse actors. As people residing within the same nation-state pursue different kinds 
and amounts of limited values, there always occurs the problem of allocation of values. 
Simply speaking, domestic politics is an “authoritative allocation of values” or is about “who 
gets what, when, and how.”
1
 In a stable domestic society, the allocation process is supposed 
to be very authoritative, and therefore, the government, which is regarded as the highest 
authoritative entity, is mainly and largely in charge of allocating limited amount of values to 
diverse people and groups of people. In other words, the government is supposed to be the 
major instrument of allocating values in a stable domestic society since the government 
monopolizes legitimate use of violence, legitimate capability to mobilize economic resources, 




Consequently, the political forces that capture the government will try to take advantage 
and use the government to allocate values in their favor, based upon their interests, identities, 
or philosophies (Moraviscik 1997). When the favorable allocation structure is constructed, 
the political forces that capture the government will again try to institutionalize the structure, 
                                                          
1 David Easton defines politics as “authoritative allocation of values.” On David Easton’s definition, 
see Easton (1965); Similarly, Harold Lasswell defines politics as “who gets what when and how.” See 
Lasswell (1958). 
2 According to Max Weber, the modern state monopolizes the means of legitimate physical violence 
over a well-defined territory. See Max Weber (1994).  




enforce the rules and laws that support the structure, disseminate norms, ideas, and theories 
that justify the structure, and co-opt the competing political forces through financial and 
other means, or coerce the resisting political forces through “legitimate” violence. The 
government, therefore, can be seen as a major instrument for the ruling political forces to 
maintain and strengthen the stable and favorable process of domestic value allocation. Of 
course, when different political forces capture the government either through legitimate 
electoral processes or through unlawful takeover, the government will again be used by the 
new political forces to change the existing allocation processes, patterns and structure in their 
favor (Moraviscik 1997). Then a new set of institutions, rules, laws, norms, ideas, theories, 
cooptation and coercion will follow. 
Within a complex modern democratic society, the above functions of maintaining and 
strengthening certain value allocation process cannot be done solely by the government. At 
the same time, since the cost of coercion and electoral loss is too heavy, the consent of the 
people becomes increasingly important. The political forces that capture the power therefore 
will not only look at the governmental instruments but will also look to the supporting 
groups in the civil society, and the vast networks of resources, information, norms and ideas 
to “govern” the state and the people. The collective set of all these resources and instruments 
has been neutrally conceptualized as “governance.” But as argued above, the concept of 
governance cannot be value-free and neutral, because it reflects the interests of the ruling 




One of the reasons that the concept of governance has become a new fad may be that the 
dominant roles and functions of the government seem to be decreasing as the society gets 
more complex, interconnected, and open than before. The network of various actors 
including the government, and cooperation among them seem to be replacing and penetrating 
many of the traditional functions and roles of the government. That does not mean that the 
government has become just one among equals in the governance network. Rather, the 
relative importance of other actors has increased. Against this backdrop, the concept of 
governance emerged as a new encompassing concept replacing the concept of government or 
“ruling,” which connotes basically uni-directional processes. But again, the concept of 
governance can be understood as a synonym of politics in the sense that it involves stable 
ways and patterns to allocate values in domestic society. 
 
(2) Governance Across the State 
The process of value allocation does not take place only within a domestic society. It also 
takes place across states. Again, within these processes of value allocation across states, 
diverse actors and political forces compete to create a pattern or structure of value allocation 
that favors them. This is what we call “international politics or relations.” In this realm, not 
unlike domestic politics, the national government emerges as the most significant instrument 
for the national actors to construct an international order that favors them. Realists argue that 
                                                          
3  This definition of governance is obviously not a conventional one which emphasizes upon 
empowering non-governmental actors. However, I do not fully take the conventional definition of 
governance because empowering non-governmental actors is also done in very biased ways so that the 
dominant groups of a society can “rule” more effectively in a complex world. Therefore, in the world 
of governance or global governance, the main actors are still dominant political groups of a society 
that capture the state. On similar understanding of domestic politics, see Moraviscik (1997). 
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materially powerful countries will dominantly construct the international order in their favor 
by exerting their power, while institutionalists or neoliberal institutionalists argue that 
international institutions can constrain the behavior of the state so that the states can 
cooperate each other when there exist common interests among them.
4
 On the other hand, 
constructivists argue that ideas, inter-subjective construction of reality do matter in building 
a peculiar type of international order.
5
 
The only difference between domestic value allocation processes and international 
processes is that there is no world government comparable to national governments in the 
international processes. But except that, the instruments to be employed to allocate values 
among diverse actors are basically the same: the government, institutions, rules, laws, norms, 
ideas, co-optation, coercion, etc. Those who capture the government of individual state, as in 
the domestic politics, use the government, institutions, and ideas or standards to construct, 
strengthen or change the structure and pattern of global value allocation processes in their 
favor. The collective set of all these instruments and network of resources that affect 
allocation processes across the state is again neutrally conceptualized as “global 
governance.”  
Recently the concept of global governance has become the new buzzword as the 
interdependence among states increased with the development of globalization, and also as 
the global interactions become extremely complex with the increased density and speed of 
interactions among increased number of actors. Again, not unlike domestic politics, people 
tend to think that the roles and the functions of the government are fading away while other 
actors and resources such as multinational corporations (MNC), non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), and international institutions and norms are increasingly taking up the 
center stage (Mathew 1997). Actors can directly contact the actors in other countries without 
the permission of the government, and oftentimes civic groups of a country can influence the 
domestic politics of other countries (Keck and Sikkink
 
1998). 
James Rosenau terms this complex process as “governance without government.” But 
that conceptualization is not accurate because the government has always been one of many 
diverse instruments for value allocation across the states. The relative importance of each 
instrument has varied in accordance with either changed balance of capabilities among the 
states, or the density of interdependence. Yet, the government is still actively used and 
employed by the dominant political forces to influence the global value allocation processes, 
though other instruments such as international institutions, ideas, norms, and standards have 
become quite conspicuous as well. Therefore, it would be much more accurate to describe 
the current pattern or structure of global value allocation processes as “governance with less 
government.” In fact, if the global governance is to be governance without government, then 
it will be very likely that the weak states or the people of the weak states will lose the most 
effective shields for them, namely the government, in the face of growing global threats and 
pressures (although there are many cases in which the governments of the weak states 
themselves are the threats to the people). It is completely unnecessary to disarm herself when 
other countries still make use of their governments to maintain or strengthening the existing 
global value allocation structure. 
                                                          
4 On discussion and debates between Realists, Neorealists, and Neoliberal Institutionalists, see Keohane 
(1986). 
5 On constructivist discussions on international relations, see Wendt (1999,1992,1995:71-81); Ruggie 
(1998: 855-885) 




Compared with domestic politics, it may be much more difficult to change the previous 
allocation order in global politics, because global politics do not allow global elections and 
the establishment of the global government to be captured by the people. Therefore, the 
global structure of value allocation naturally reflects the interests of the powerful political 
forces of the advanced industrialized countries, be they capitalists, specific industries, or 
NGOs. Unless those powerful groups or transnational coalitions of those powerful groups are 
replaced by other powerful groups or coalitions, the international order or global governance 
structure can hardly change. Recently, there increasingly appear some new ways to change or 
rearrange the global governance structure, and one major example of them is the so called 
“regional responses.” European Union is a typical example, and NAFTA, ASEAN, ASEAN 
+ 3, EAS, MERCOSUR, etc. are other examples.  
These regional responses have been initiated for various reasons, but one major function 
of these regional responses is to rearrange the global governance structure by creating 
individual, but inter-connected regional governance structures.
6
 As is well known, some are 
successful, and some are not. But having these regional governance structure brings about a 
big benefit, and that is what I call “national safety net.” In the following sections, I will 
critically review the current discussion and patterns of global governance from a soft power 
perspective, and suggest why we need East Asian Governance, East Asian Standard, and 
East Asian Consensus to build a national safety net in the region. 
 
 
2. GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SOFT POWER 
 
2.1. Different Categories of Soft Power 
 
The concept of soft power was first introduced by Joseph Nye in his book, “Bound to 
Lead,” to explain and predict the persistence of the US hegemony during the days of 
American national decline in the 1980s (Nye
 
1990). In its original conception, soft power 
was defined as co-optive behavioral power, meaning “getting others to want what you want” 
(Nye
 
1990:188). But as the concept itself has become very much in fashion, it expanded its 




Generally speaking, soft power that uses soft resources such as culture or images can be 
roughly categorized into five categories in accordance with the policy goals to achieve.
8
 
They are: (1) soft power to improve external security environment by projecting peaceful and 
attractive images of a country; (2) soft power to mobilize other countries’ supports for one’s 
foreign and security policies; (3) soft power to manipulate other countries’ way of thinking 
and preferences; (4) soft power to maintain unity of a community or community of countries; 
(5) soft power to increase approval ratings of a leader or domestic support of a government. 
(1) Examples of the first category of soft power are China’s recent emphasis on “peaceful 
                                                          
6 On very well studied theoretical discussions on regionalism, see Mansfield and Helen (1997); on 
recent trends of regionalism in East Asia, see Yoshimatsu (2008). 
7 The author has a different definition and a theory of soft power from those of Joseph Nye. See Geun 
Lee (June, Forthcoming). 
8 The following discussion on different categories and strategies of soft power is mainly taken from my 
previous article. See Geun Lee (June, Forthcoming). 
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rising or development” and “harmonious world” (Cho and
 
Jeong 2008), and Japan’s post-
War efforts to project peaceful image of itself through the Peace Constitution, 3 Non-nuclear 
Principles, self-restraint of Self Defense Forces, and 1% GDP limit on defense spending 
(Pharr 1993). The soft power strategy of this category contains combination of “soft 
resources” such as national slogans, policy proposals, and public diplomacy to minimize 
threatening images while projecting a peace-loving image of a country when a country is 
either entering the international society as a new or transformed member, or is rapidly rising 
in terms of its hard power. The case of China pertains to both aspects as China has been 
rising extremely rapidly in terms of its hard power capabilities while it tries to enter the 
international society as a normal responsible country leaving behind the past history of 
communist legacies. Unless the increase of China’s hard power capabilities is balanced with 
soft power capabilities, it is very probable that China will face a formidable coalition of 
antagonistic countries that may be threatened by China’s increased hard power. The debate 
on the “Rise of China” is evidence of this threatening perception about China’s increased 
hard power by other countries, particularly the US (Saunders
 
 2001). 
(2) The second category of soft power is necessary for an effective leadership in 
mobilizing collective actions among countries. Unless an action by a leading country is 
justified by reasonable rationales or causes, the leading country cannot form an effective 
coalition of countries. Recent criticisms against the lack of US soft power in its global war 
on terrorism or the war in Iraq all pertain to this category of soft power (Nye 2004). General 
examples of the second category of soft power are justification of economic sanctions or 
foreign invasions through the UN procedures such as General Assembly resolutions or 
Security Council resolutions. Theories of Just War or manipulation of images of enemies by 
news media also belong to this second category. This category of soft power is important in 
saving costs of hard power because burden sharing can be done among coalition partners. 
(3) The third category of soft power aims at more direct consequence of changing 
preferences and behaviors of others by using ideational resources. Examples of the third 
category are spreading standards, theories, concepts, or discourses to other countries so that 
they adopt specific ways of thinking. “Washington Consensus,” “Neoliberalism,” “Global 
Standard or Governance” discourses are some of the examples of the theories and discourses 
developed and spread by Anglo-American powers (Harvey 2005; Chang 2002; Faux 2006). 
Japan also had similar soft power in the past when it developed and spread “flying geese 
model,” “Toyotaism,” “Just-in-time system” or “soft authoritarianism” (Deyo 1987; 
Yamamura and Yasukichi
 
1987; Dore 1988; Friedman 1988). International celebrities can 
play important roles in spreading theories, and discourses. Books, lectures, comments of 
international celebrities such as Nobel laureates, famous entrepreneurs like Bill Gates, or star 
politicians are very influential in exerting this category of soft power. Therefore, possession 
of internationally famous celebrities contributes greatly to the soft power potential of a 
country.  
(4) Maintaining a large size of political economic entities such as an empire, a nation, or 
a community demands soft power at the center of the entities because coercive, violent 
suppression of defectors are too costly and too short-term. Natural identification or loyalty 
by the members of such entities pertains to this area of soft power. Examples of the fourth 
category are an empire’s efforts to maintain its unity over a vast imperial territory through 
imperial museum, imperial rituals, common languages, invention of traditions, and common 






 The EU’s efforts to establish common European Constitution and other 
institutions, and symbols are a similar example.  
(5) Examples of the fifth category are creating national heroes, invoking patriotism by 
international sports competition, or showing a leader’s outstanding performances in 
international summits or conferences so as to increase domestic popularity of a leader or a 
government. In most cases, the fifth category of soft power is geared toward domestic 
audience rather than international audience. However, without international dimension, this 
fifth category of soft power cannot exist either. 
 
2.2. Soft Power Strategies 
 
Among many soft power strategies to achieve the soft power goals mentioned above, 




(1) Manipulation or creation of self-images to improve security environments: A typical 
example of this strategy is Germany’s and Japan’s post World War II efforts to repent on 
its imperial atrocities and consequent institutionalization and repeated rituals relating to 
the repentance. Peace constitution and self-restraint on defense spending and 
remilitarization in Japan helped preventing hostile coalitions against Japan from forming 
in the Asian region which were of course complemented by the presence of the US-
Japan alliance. Germany’s peaceful coexistence with the surrounding European countries 
has been made possible by sincere repentance and attitude by German leaders and 
politicians regarding the behaviors of Nazis (which was again complemented by the 
presence of NATO, and other multilateral institutions in Europe). On the other hand, 
when images of a country reflect better capabilities, attractiveness, the individual level 
security (human security) of foreign residents of the country will improve as they will 
face less discrimination or more respect in the country of their residence. 
(2) Manipulation of others’ images to mobilize supports for collective actions: the US has 
been particularly adroit in manipulating or creating others’ negative images to mobilize 
international supports for collective actions under the US leadership. Identifying the 
Soviet Union as an “Evil Empire,” or pinpointing Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as “Axis of 
Evil” are typical examples. On the other hand, the UN can create an image or theories of 
global warming (sense of fear and urgency) so that nations in the world can collectively 
act under the UN leadership to reduce the so-called green house gases.
11
 When the leader 
country has an image of representing universal values such as liberty, freedom, 
democracy, poverty eradication, it will be easier to mobilize supports for collective 
actions. 
(3) Network Effect Strategy: Spreading certain standards, behavioral codes, and common 
reference point is the central element of this strategy. The goal of this strategy is to form 
an external environment which favors the countries, companies, or interest groups that 
are already accustomed to the standards, norms, rules, or institutions.
12
 Spread of global 
                                                          
9 On the relationship between the Roman Empire and its Soft Power, see Kim (2005). On theoretical 
insights relating to this category of soft power, see McNeill (1995). 
10 On more detailed discussion on soft power strategies, see Geun Lee (2004:1-18). 
11 On the agenda setting power of international organizations, see Barnett and Finnemore (1999). 
12 On this, see Geun Lee (2006). 
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standards, Washington Consensus, international language of English, certain develop-
ment models such as neoliberalism or the Japanese model in the past all created certain 
networks that favor particular countries, companies and other actors by changing the 
ways of thinking in the recipient countries. 
(4) Heroes and Celebrities: Heroes and celebrities can exert soft power in two ways. One is 
by their role model functions, and comments or charities for certain universal values, and 
the other is by manufacturing a sense of pride within their own countries. The former can 
set an international agenda to achieve certain national or international goals, while the 
latter provokes nationalistic cohesion or wide supports for their governments. Here, 
heroes or celebrities can act independently or in cooperation (or cooptation) with their 
governments. 
 
2.3. Soft Power and Global Governance 
 
As shown above, global governance of constructing a particular structure or pattern of 
value allocation processes pertains to the area of soft power because global governance 
discourses tend to emphasize non-violent ways of governing the global affairs. For example, 
global governance which emphasizes upon theories and discourses on climate change tends 
to change the ideas and preferences of both governmental and non-governmental actors such 
as civic groups, companies, and consumers in general. This change will affect both global 
and domestic value allocation processes because people become gradually reluctant to 
consume fossil fuels, because energy producers start to worry about market restructuring, 
and domestic and global rules, norms, and principles start to change. Those who are 
benefiting from this changed value allocation process may be environmental groups, 
companies with strong competitive edge in alternative energy technologies, and countries 
that have already taken reforms in energy sectors, to name a few. On the other hand, fossil 
fuel dependent companies, consumers, and countries will suffer greatly if strong regulation 
on previous pattern of energy consumption is to be enforced. This is a typical pattern of 
global governance relying upon new ideas, theories, or discourses which ultimately leads to 
introduction of new governmental regulations. In other words, soft power of the groups that 
support and promote new ideas and theories of global warming is clearly visible, and the 
discussion of “epistemic community” shows how non-governmental groups exercise soft 




The third and fourth categories of soft power described above, therefore, are particularly 
relevant to the discussion of global governance in this paper. In addition, the third strategy, 
namely network effect strategy is the main instrument of global governance in that it is a 
non-violent and indirect way of settling a particular structure or pattern of global value 
allocation processes. Especially, the global governance instruments such as “global standard” 
and “Washington Consensus” or a theory like “neoliberalism” are typical cases of soft power 
projection by a group of people who are dominantly benefiting from the global standard, 
namely Washington Consensus or neoliberalism, when those instruments become the main 
elements of global governance. In other words, global standards including Washington 
Consensus, or neoliberalism, if adopted by most of the countries in the world will create a 
global value allocation structure within which a peculiar group of political economic forces, 
                                                          
13 On epistemic community see, Haas (1992); Adler and  Haas (2005). 




such as globally mobile capital, big conglomerates which have been constrained by market 
regulations, and big asset holders, will mainly benefit. On the other hand, beneficiaries of 
social welfare system, less competitive sectors and market players, labors in general will 
suffer from the neoliberal value allocation structure particularly for the countries without 
well developed social safety net. Adoption of global standard and Washington Consensus by 
a country will create a network effect in that country, which will be accompanied by path 
dependency in its later stage of development that tends to favor particular segments of a 
society while excluding others. In this sense, governance or global governance cannot be 
seen as a neutral way of empowering non-governmental actors in general. 
One important aspect of this kind of global governance is that in fact, global standard is a 
standard usually originated from a very unique group of countries in which the capitalist 
market institutions are generally referred as “Liberal Market Economy.”
14
 Therefore, 
contrary to the term “global standard,” the standard itself is not really global. As the 
researchers in the “variety of capitalism school” argue, the countries that have different types 
of market economy will have to pay high political, social, and economic costs if they are to 
adopt such “global standard” (Pontusson 2005; Iverson 2005). Moreover, adoption of global 
standards does not always produce better results than other standards as national system of 
innovation and institutional settings are not identical all over the world (Berger and Dore 
1996; Kozo and Wolfgang 2003). 
 
 
3. EAST ASIAN GOVERNANCE, EAST ASIAN STANDARD, AND EAST ASIAN 
CONSENSUS 
 
Unconditional acceptance and import of the so-called global standard and global 
governance instruments to countries that have very different institutional settings and path 
dependency from the countries of origin of the global standard will create huge political, 
economic, and social adjustment costs. Moreover, as there is the so-called first mover 
advantage accompanied by path dependency in this world of networks, those countries that 
are unnaturally nested within these networks will have hard time catching up with the early 
movers. Therefore, countries having different institutional and cultural characteristics need to 
have different governance mechanism particularly to protect themselves from the high tides 
of global standard in the name of global governance. Regional blocs or regional cooperation 
is one such mechanism. 
East Asia is still an emerging concept and an emerging region. It does not have a regional 
identity and has not constituted a “cognitive region.”
15
 However, East Asia is already being 
constructed in the sense that it is a region that can be distinguished from Europe, America, or 
Africa. Moreover, East Asia shares somewhat unique common characteristics in its 
developmental path which is the extensive and active roles of the government or the high 
degree of “stateness” in its economic and political life worlds.
16
 The East Asian NICs and the 
second generation NICs and Japan all share quite high degree of stateness. This characteristic 
is certainly vastly different from the current but fragile global standard originated from the 
liberal market economies. 
                                                          
14 On the categorization of varieties of capitalism, see Pontusson (2005); Swank (2002). 
15 On the concept of a cognitive region, see Adler (2005). 
16 On the concept of “stateness,” see J.P. Nettle (1968). 
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Of course, global governance is indeed necessary in this age of globalization, because 
without certain mechanisms to govern the globalization, the so-called global village will 
become very unstable and full of uncertainty. Uncertainty and instability create high risks, 
and high risks hinder positive globalization. However, global governance is not an even 
process and the individual countries need to make every effort to build a level playing field. 
One way of producing a shield or umbrella against unfair tides of globalization is having a 
regional governance structure that favors the regional actors at the time of global crisis, or in 
the face of fierce global or inter-regional competitions. The European Union, the adoption of 
the euro, and many common practices, norms and standards within the EU are typical 
examples of such regional governance structure against the global crisis and competition. 
Regional common markets provide scale economy to the countries in the region 
(Mansfield and Milner 1997), and regional cooperation system provides what I call “national 
safety net” which is an equivalent of social safety net at the international level. In times of 
global financial crisis, regional cooperation will provide financial aids in the form of 
currency swaps or a regional fund, for example, and in times of fierce global competition, 
regional cooperation can arrange a smooth restructuring transition together.  
In order to build such an umbrella in East Asia, now it is necessary to talk about East 
Asian governance, East Asian Standard, and East Asian Consensus so that East Asia can find 
itself, and also share genuine East Asian governance structure perhaps reflecting positive 
roles of the government as high stateness is the common characteristics of the countries in 
the region. Many people are still skeptical about East Asian regional cooperation and 
governance seeing very shallow cultural, historical, and institutional commonalities in the 
region. However, as we practice more speech acts by searching for East Asian governance 
and standards, such East Asian governance structure will eventually emerge and evolve. 
One can think of some soft power strategies to develop such East Asian governance 
structure or standards. For example, as China has been doing through Boao Forum, East 
Asian countries can create an influential forum or a network of existing forums to construct 
and diffuse East Asian standards which are distinguished from seemingly failing neoliberal 
global standards.
17
 Such a strategy will be much more effective if East Asian countries can 
come up with a self image which emphasizes upon community values, social trust, social 
kindness in terms of paying sympathy to others, and life-time employment practices that may 
be relatively absent in the liberal market economies. Perhaps East Asian countries can 
suggest an alternative vision such as “survival of the kindest” instead of “survival of the 
fittest.” East Asian universities can develop common curricula developing and emphasizing 
such vision and ideas, and also can come up with good social science textbooks containing 
core elements of East Asian standards. East Asian experts can also think about building 
epistemic community of their own in diverse areas covering economic, social, political and 
cultural issues. Although all these concepts, ideas and slogans are still underdeveloped and 
vague concepts, by creating influential forums in East Asia and also by publishing influential 
East Asian journals or setting up media, East Asian opinion leaders, scholars may be able to 
improve and develop such underdeveloped East Asian standards and ideas. Perhaps, when 
such ideas, discourses, and theories are developed to a certain extent, Asian heroes and 
celebrities such as internationally renowned CEOs and politicians can play a major role in 
attracting attention of East Asian people and others.   
In sum, global governance is a reflection of global politics, and it reflects a particular 
                                                          
17 On Boao Forum and China’s soft power see, Cho and Jeong (2008: 453-472) 




structure and pattern of global value allocation processes that favor early developers in the 
West. East Asian countries are not the leaders of such governance structure, and have been 
passive actors in managing the global order. Therefore, it is highly recommended that the 
countries and many diverse actors in this region participate in building a regional umbrella 
actively at the regional level, and eventually construct an East Asia and East Asian 
Governance and Standards.  
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